The Fallacy of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence

  title={The Fallacy of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence},
  author={Rebecca Bennett},
  journal={Wiley-Blackwell: Bioethics},
  • R. Bennett
  • Published 27 May 2009
  • Philosophy, Medicine
  • Wiley-Blackwell: Bioethics
The claim that we have a moral obligation, where a choice can be made, to bring to birth the 'best' child possible, has been highly controversial for a number of decades. More recently Savulescu has labelled this claim the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. It has been argued that this Principle is problematic in both its reasoning and its implications, most notably in that it places lower moral value on the disabled. Relentless criticism of this proposed moral obligation, however, has been… 
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