The Fall of Litvinov: Harbinger of the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact

  title={The Fall of Litvinov: Harbinger of the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact},
  author={Albert Resis},
  journal={Europe-Asia Studies},
  pages={33 - 56}
  • Albert Resis
  • Published 1 January 2000
  • History
  • Europe-Asia Studies
HISTORIANS HAVE LONG SPECULATED on the reasons for Stalin's dismissal of Maxim Litvinov as Commissar for Foreign Affairs on 3 May 1939, and the connection it had, if any, with Stalin's subsequent rapprochement with Hitler. The consensus holds that the removal of Litvinov, the paladin of collective security, and his replacement by Molotov, were prompted by a policy difference, the rejection by Stalin and Molotov of Litvinov's orientation to the West. Thus 3 May steered the Soviet Union toward… 
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