The Extralegal Development of Securities Trading in Seventeenth Century Amsterdam

@article{Stringham2001TheED,
  title={The Extralegal Development of Securities Trading in Seventeenth Century Amsterdam},
  author={E. Stringham},
  journal={History of Finance eJournal},
  year={2001}
}
  • E. Stringham
  • Published 2001
  • Economics
  • History of Finance eJournal
It is often argued that government rule enforcement is necessary for the development of a stock market (Glaeser, Johnson, & Shleifer, 2001). Work by Boot, Stuart, and Thakor (1993), Klein and Leffler (1981), and Telser (1980), however, suggests that repeated interaction and reputation can create incentives for contracts to be self-enforcing. This paper investigates these claims by examining the first stock market, the Amsterdam Bourse. At a time when many financial contracts were unenforceable… Expand
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