The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons

  title={The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons},
  author={Paul K. Huth},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={270 - 290}
  • Paul K. Huth
  • Published 1 June 1990
  • Political Science
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution
Three questions are addressed in this study: (1) Does a nuclear retaliatory capability contribute to extended deterrence against a nonnuclear power? (2) If so, is the deterrent value of nuclear weapons contingent upon the prior credible threat of conventional armed engagement by the defender? (3) Or, is the deterrent impact of nuclear weapons so potent that the conventional balance of forces has little deterrent impact? Competing hypotheses are formulated and then tested by probit analysis. The… 

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