The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory

@article{Roth1984TheEO,
  title={The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory},
  author={Alvin E. Roth},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={1984},
  volume={92},
  pages={991 - 1016}
}
  • A. Roth
  • Published 1 December 1984
  • Economics
  • Journal of Political Economy
The organization of the labor market for medical interns and residents underwent a number of changes before taking its present form in 1951. The record of these changes and the problems that prompted them provides an unusual opportunity to study the forces at work in markets of this kind. The present paper begins with a brief history and then presents a game-theoretic analysis to explain the orderly operation and longevity of the current market, in contrast to the turmoil that characterized… 
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