The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks

  title={The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks},
  author={Tatsuya Sasaki and Hitoshi Yamamoto and Isamu Okada and Satoshi Uchida},
Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affect human cooperation in social networks. Although it is known that two of the major mechanisms in the evolution of cooperation are spatial selection and reputation-based reciprocity, theoretical study of the interplay between both mechanisms remains almost uncharted. Here, we present a new individual-based model for the evolution of reciprocal cooperation between reputation and networks. We… 

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