The Evolution of Ethnocentrism

  title={The Evolution of Ethnocentrism},
  author={Ross A. Hammond and Robert Axelrod},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={926 - 936}
Ethnocentrism is a nearly universal syndrome of attitudes and behaviors, typically including in-group favoritism. Empirical evidence suggests that a predisposition to favor in-groups can be easily triggered by even arbitrary group distinctions and that preferential cooperation within groups occurs even when it is individually costly. The authors study the emergence and robustness of ethnocentric behaviors of in-group favoritism, using an agent-based evolutionary model. They show that such… 

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