The Evolution of Coercive Institutional Punishment

Abstract

Institutional punishment plays a central role in human societies. Yet research in evolutionary game theory has focused almost exclusively on peer punishment. Here we present a model for the evolution of institutional punishment. We consider a set of states (“kingdoms”), each consisting of a number of individuals (“subjects”) and a single leader (“king… (More)
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-011-0020-9

Topics

5 Figures and Tables

Statistics

02040201520162017
Citations per Year

Citation Velocity: 9

Averaging 9 citations per year over the last 3 years.

Learn more about how we calculate this metric in our FAQ.

Cite this paper

@article{Isakov2012TheEO, title={The Evolution of Coercive Institutional Punishment}, author={Alexander Isakov and David G. Rand}, journal={Dynamic Games and Applications}, year={2012}, volume={2}, pages={97-109} }