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# The Equilibrium Existence Problem in Finite Network Congestion Games

@inproceedings{Milchtaich2006TheEE, title={The Equilibrium Existence Problem in Finite Network Congestion Games}, author={Igal Milchtaich}, booktitle={WINE}, year={2006} }

- Published 2006 in WINE
DOI:10.1007/11944874_9

An open problem is presented regarding the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE) in network congestion games with a finite number of non-identical players, in which the strategy set of each player is the collection of all paths in a given network that link the player’s origin and destination vertices, and congestion increases the costs of edges. A network congestion game in which the players differ only in their origin–destination pairs is a potential game, which implies that… CONTINUE READING