The End of History for Corporate Law

@article{Hansmann2000TheEO,
  title={The End of History for Corporate Law},
  author={H. Hansmann and Reinier H. Kraakman},
  journal={Corporate Law: Corporate \& Securities Law eJournal},
  year={2000}
}
Despite the apparent divergence in institutions of governance, share ownership, capital markets, and business culture across developed economies, the basic law of the corporate form has already achieved a high degree of uniformity, and continued convergence is likely. A principal reason for convergence is a widespread normative consensus that corporate managers should act exclusively in the economic interests of shareholders, including noncontrolling shareholders. This consensus on a… Expand
Comparative Corporate Governance
The political economy of comparative corporate governance
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References

refers to processes in which facially different governance structures or legal rules develop to solve the same underlying functional problem as “ functional convergence