The End of Bankruptcy

  title={The End of Bankruptcy},
  author={Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen},
  journal={Stanford Law Review},
The law of corporate reorganizations is conventionally justified as a way to preserve a firm's going-concern value: Specialized assets in a particular firm are worth more together in that firm than anywhere else. This paper shows that this notion is mistaken. Its flaw is that it lacks a well-developed understanding of the nature of a firm. Initially, it is easy to confuse size with specialization and overstate the extent to which assets are dedicated to a particular enterprise. Even when such… Expand
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