• DOI:10.1086/515416
Corpus ID: 120400315

The Empirical Nonequivalence of Genic and Genotypic Models of Selection: A (Decisive) Refutation of Genic Selectionism and Pluralistic Genic Selectionism*

@article{Brandon2006TheEN,
  title={The Empirical Nonequivalence of Genic and Genotypic Models of Selection: A (Decisive) Refutation of Genic Selectionism and Pluralistic Genic Selectionism*},
  author={R. Brandon and H. Nijhout},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  year={2006},
  volume={73},
  pages={277 - 297}
}

• R. Brandon, H. Nijhout
• Published 2006
• Biology
• Philosophy of Science

Genic selectionists (Williams 1966; Dawkins 1976) defend the view that genes are the (unique) units of selection and that all evolutionary events can be adequately represented at the genic level. Pluralistic genic selectionists (Sterelny and Kitcher 1988; Waters 1991; Dawkins 1982) defend the weaker view that in many cases there are multiple equally adequate accounts of evolutionary events, but that always among the set of equally adequate representations will be one at the genic level. We… Expand

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