The Emergence and Persistence of Oligarchy : A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Political Power

@inproceedings{Jeon2015TheEA,
  title={The Emergence and Persistence of Oligarchy : A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Political Power},
  author={Jee Seon Jeon},
  year={2015}
}
In this article, I present a formal model in which multiple groups within a society bargain over an object that influences their future bargaining power. Interpreting the bargaining object as wealth, this model provides a theoretical framework to examine the long-run consequences of the interdependency between economic and political power. Alternatively, by interpreting the bargaining object as political institutions that affects future power of relevant political actors, the model provides a… CONTINUE READING

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