The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign

@article{List2002TheEO,
  title={The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign},
  author={John A. List and David Lucking-Reiley},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={2002},
  volume={110},
  pages={215 - 233}
}
We design a field experiment to test two theories of fund‐raising for threshold public goods: Andreoni predicts that publicly announced “seed money” will increase charitable donations, whereas Bagnoli and Lipman predict a similar increase for a refund policy. Experimentally manipulating a solicitation of 3,000 households for a university capital campaign produced data confirming both predictions. Increasing seed money from 10 percent to 67 percent of the campaign goal produced a nearly sixfold… 
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References

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Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund‐Raising
Private providers of public goods, such as charities, invariably enlist fund‐raisers to organize and collect contributions. Common in charitable fund‐raising is seed money, either from a government
A Note on the Theory of Charitable Fund‐raising: The Role of Refunds
Andreoni (1998) shows that a small amount of seed money from the government can generate substantial additional private donations toward the provision of a public good, when there is a threshold
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Abstract Charities publicize the donations they receive, generally according to dollar categories rather than the exact amount. Donors in turn tend to give the minimum amount necessary to get into a
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If people are so self-interested, why do they give their money away to charities? One possibility is that people care about the level of the public good their donations provide. But this is not a
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Do explicit warnings eliminate the hypothetical bias in elicitation procedures? Evidence from field auctions for sportscards
  • J. List
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • 2001
TLDR
The goal of this study is to take the cheap talk design to a well-functioning marketplace and auction off sportscards, and explore the generality of Cummings and Taylor's findings by examining whether experience with the good in question affects hypothetical bias through inclusion of both card dealers and nondealers in the field auctions.
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