The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust

@article{Malhotra2002TheEO,
  title={The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust},
  author={Deepak Malhotra and J. Keith Murnighan},
  journal={Administrative Science Quarterly},
  year={2002},
  volume={47},
  pages={534 - 559}
}
This paper uses two laboratory experiments to investigate the effects of contracts on interpersonal trust. We predict that the use of binding contracts to promote or mandate cooperation will lead interacting parties to attribute others' cooperation to the constraints imposed by the contract rather than to the individuals themselves, thus reducing the likelihood of trust developing. We also predict that, although non-binding contracts may not generate as much initial cooperation as binding… 

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