The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods

@article{Sefton2007TheEO,
  title={The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods},
  author={M. Sefton and Robert Shupp and James M. Walker},
  journal={ERN: Experimental Economics (Topic)},
  year={2007}
}
I. INTRODUCTION The experimental literature on voluntary public goods provision shows that groups attain better outcomes than implied by economic models based on individuals maximizing own-monetary earnings. At the same time, however, groups uniformly fail to achieve optimal outcomes, suggesting that incentives to free ride are important. Moreover, when the decision situation is repeated, the group outcome often deteriorates with repetition, suggesting that, in many settings, a group's ability… Expand
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