The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting . By Oliver E. Williamson. (New York: Free Press, 1985. Pp. 450. $27.95.)

  title={The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting . By Oliver E. Williamson. (New York: Free Press, 1985. Pp. 450. \$27.95.)},
  author={Alan Stone},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  • Alan Stone
  • Published 1 December 1986
  • Economics
  • American Political Science Review

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