The Economic Effects of Constitutions

  title={The Economic Effects of Constitutions},
  author={Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini},
The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across… 

The economic effects of constitutions: do budget institutions make forms of government more alike?

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The institutional design of monetary policy

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An Economic Theory of Constitutional Choice

There is now a wide consensus among economists, political scientists and policy makers that institutions play a role in fiscal policy outcomes and economic growth. What is still unclear, or there is


  • S. Saima
  • Economics, Political Science
  • 2015
Economic policies are basically the outcomes of the interaction between interest groups and institutional infrastructure of the governments. Political powers in each government exert pressure on

Essays in Public Finance and Political Economy

This collection of essays provides an empirical investigation on political institutions and electoral systems. All of the chapters use a regression discontinuity design and exploit the framework of

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