The Econometrics and Some Properties of Separable Matching Models

@article{Galichon2017TheEA,
  title={The Econometrics and Some Properties of Separable Matching Models},
  author={Alfred Galichon and Bernard Salani'e},
  journal={The American Economic Review},
  year={2017},
  volume={107},
  pages={251-255}
}
We present a class of one-to-one matching models with perfectly transferable utility. We discuss identification and inference in these separable models, and we show how their comparative statics are readily analyzed. 
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