The Dynamics of Contractual and Relational Governance: Evidence From Long-Term Public-Private Procurement Arrangements

@article{Zheng2008TheDO,
  title={The Dynamics of Contractual and Relational Governance: Evidence From Long-Term Public-Private Procurement Arrangements},
  author={Jurong Zheng and Jens K. Roehrich and Michael A. Lewis},
  journal={ERN: Formal \& Relational Contracts Between Firms (Topic)},
  year={2008}
}
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