The Dunning-Kruger effect revisited.

  title={The Dunning-Kruger effect revisited.},
  author={Matan Mazor and Stephen M. Fleming},
  journal={Nature human behaviour},
In one of the most highly replicable findings in social psychology, Kruger and Dunning1 showed that participants who performed worse in tests of humour, reasoning, and grammar were also more likely to overestimate their performance. In their original report, Kruger and Dunning interpreted this overconfidence in the self-reports of low performers as a metacognitive deficiency, such that poor performers suffer a ‘dual burden’: in addition to their incompetence in the task, they are unable to… 
2 Citations
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Competing interests The authors declare no conflicts of interest. Nature HumaN BeHaviour |
  • Soc. Psychol
  • 2002