The Doomsday Argument Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe

  title={The Doomsday Argument Adam \& Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe},
  author={Nick Bostrom},
  • N. Bostrom
  • Published 1 June 2001
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • Synthese
The Doomsday argument purports to show that the risk of the human species going extinct soon has been systematically underestimated. This argument has something in common with controversial forms of reasoning in other areas, including: game theoretic problems with imperfect recall, the methodology of cosmology, the epistemology of indexical belief, and the debate over so-called fine-tuning arguments for the design hypothesis. The common denominator is a certain premiss: the Self-Sampling… 
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  • D. Bradley
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • 2005
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  • D. Dieks
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • 2006
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  • B. Carter
  • Biology, Mathematics
    Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences
  • 1983
It is shown that the evidence suggests that the evolutionary chain included at least one but probably not more than two links that were highly improbable (a priori) in the available time interval.
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