The Distribution of Power in the Lebanese Parliament Revisited

@inproceedings{Diss2017TheDO,
  title={The Distribution of Power in the Lebanese Parliament Revisited},
  author={Mostapha Diss and Frank Steffen},
  year={2017}
}
The governance structure of the Lebanese Republic is particularly characterized byits confessional nature guaranteeing a pre-defined representation of Christians andMuslims and its sectarian subgroups in parliament. In this sense, the composition of the parliament is based on the allocation of a specific number of seats to each of the two major religious groups and its sectarian subgroups. However, the ratio being used to assign seats to these sectarian subgroups has been an intensively debated… 

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