The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox

@inproceedings{Douven2006TheDD,
  title={The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox},
  author={Igor Douven and Jan-Willem Romeijn},
  year={2006}
}
List and Pettit have stated an impossibility theorem about the aggregation of individual opinion states. Building on recent work on the lottery paradox, this paper offers a variation on that result. The present result places different constraints on the voting agenda and the domain of profiles, but it covers a larger class of voting rules, which need not satisfy the proposition-wise independence 

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