The Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions: The Structure of Arguments about Fallacies

  title={The Dialectic of Second-Order Distinctions: The Structure of Arguments about Fallacies},
  author={David P. Goodwin},
  journal={Informal Logic},
Arguments about fallacies generally attempt to distinguish real from apparent modes of argumentation and reasoning. To examine the structure of these arguments, this paper develops a theory of dialectical distinction. First, it explores the connection between Nicholas Rescher's concept of distinction as a "dialectical countermove" and Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrecht-Tyteca's "dissociation of ideas." Next, it applies a theory of distinction to Aristotle's extended arguments about fallacies in De… 
Fallacies in Transition: An Assessment of the Pragma-Dialectical Perspective
The paper critically investigates the pragma-dialectics of van Eemeren and Grootendorst, particularly the treatment of fallacies. While the pragma-dialectieians claim that dialectics combines the
Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory : A Handbook of Historical Backgrounds and Contemporary Developments
Contents: Preface. Introduction. Part I: Historical Backgrounds. Analytic, Dialectic and Rhetoric. Analysis of Fallacies, Controversy, and Discussion. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric.
Rhetorics of Health Citizenship: Exploring Vernacular Critiques of Government’s Role in Supporting Healthy Living
This article explores how older adults negotiate and partially counter normative expectations of “health citizenship” that stress individual responsibility for maintaining health and preventing health problems by deploying a logic of dissociation to address structural-political-economic dimensions of healthy living.


What's Wrong with Slippery Slope Arguments?
  • T. Govier
  • Philosophy
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy
  • 1982
Slippery slope arguments are commonly thought to be fallacious. But is there a single fallacy which they all commit? A study of applied logic texts reveals competing diagnoses of the supposed error,
The Fallacy of Begging the Question
Begging the question — roughly, positing in the premises what is to be proved in the conclusion — is a perplexing fallacy.1 Are not question-begging arguments valid? Yes, we may find ourselves
Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation
This chapter discusses natural language argumentation as reasoned dialogue, which aims to clarify the role of emotion, bias, and fallacies in argumentation.