The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics

  title={The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics},
  author={Avinash Dixit and John Londregan},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  pages={1132 - 1155}
We examine what determines whether an interest group will receive favors in pork-barrel politics, using a model of majority voting with two competing parties. Each group's membership is heterogeneous in its ideological affinity for the parties. Individuals face a trade-off between party affinity and their own transfer receipts. The model is general enough to yield two often-discussed but competing theories as special cases. If the parties are equally effective in delivering transfers to any… 

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