The Design of Advertising Exchanges

@article{McAfee2011TheDO,
  title={The Design of Advertising Exchanges},
  author={R. McAfee},
  journal={Review of Industrial Organization},
  year={2011},
  volume={39},
  pages={169-185}
}
  • R. McAfee
  • Published 2011
  • Economics
  • Review of Industrial Organization
  • Internet advertising exchanges possess three characteristics—fast delivery, low values, and automated systems—that influence market design. Automated learning systems induce the winner’s curse when several pricing types compete. Bidders frequently compete with different data, which induces randomization in equilibrium. Machine learning causes the value of information to leak across participants. Discrimination may be used to induce efficient exploration, although publishers (websites) may balk… CONTINUE READING
    46 Citations

    Figures from this paper

    Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
    • 88
    • Highly Influenced
    • PDF
    Competition between demand-side intermediaries in ad exchanges
    • 2
    • Highly Influenced
    • PDF
    Optimal Allocation for Display Advertising
    • PDF

    References

    SHOWING 1-10 OF 32 REFERENCES
    Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
    • 88
    • PDF
    An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information
    • 402
    • PDF
    Value of Learning in Sponsored Search Auctions
    • 27
    • PDF
    Comparing predicted prices in auctions for online advertising
    • 9
    • PDF
    Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction
    • P. Milgrom
    • Economics
    • Journal of Political Economy
    • 2000
    • 691
    • PDF
    Communications to the Editor---Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information
    • 103
    The Greatest Auction in History
    • 15
    • PDF
    The Economics of Block Booking
    • 213
    • PDF
    Better Living through Economics
    • 21
    • PDF