The Demodernisation of an Army: Northern Afghanistan, 1992–2001

  title={The Demodernisation of an Army: Northern Afghanistan, 1992–2001},
  author={A. Giustozzi},
  journal={Small Wars \& Insurgencies},
  pages={1 - 18}
  • A. Giustozzi
  • Published 2004
  • Sociology
  • Small Wars & Insurgencies
After the fall of the communist regime in Afghanistan, remnants of the Afghan regular army organized themselves into one of the factional armies which filled the vacuum created by the collapse of the Afghan state. Initially, this army maintained features similar to those of the regular forces from which it came, but over the years it developed into something closer and closer to the militias which occupied most of the rest of the country. The article tries to explain the causes of this… Expand
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Reaping the Whirlwind (Pluto Press: London 2003) pp.87–88
  • 2003
Beyond the Oxus (London: John Murray 2002) pp.224–225
  • 2002
Gareev, Moya poslednyaya voina (Insan
  • Moscow 1996),
  • 1996
Le parti de Dostom: le Junbesh
  • in Afghanistan info,
  • 1993
), even at its maximum production of 105,000 tons per year the factory should not have exceeded a turnover of US$28.4 million. Profits, therefore, should have been in the range of US$2-4 million
  • AFP
According to Human Rights Watch
  • citing Uzbek journalists and Western diplomats, and Whitlock
Afghanistan country analysis brief
  • Petroleum Economist
Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity?
  • although footnote 163 does not indicate any specific source for Junbesh
Aiding Afghanistan (NIAS, 1995)
    In spring 1993 he authorised Muawin Sher Ahmad to form a new brigade in Khulm (Walwalji, note 8