The Democratic Political Economy Of Progressive Income Taxation

  title={The Democratic Political Economy Of Progressive Income Taxation},
  author={John E. Roemer},
Why do both left and right political parties typically propose progressive income taxation schemes in political competition? Analysis of this problem has been hindered by the two-dimensionality of the issue space. To give parties a choice over a domain which contains both progressive and regressive income tax policies requires an issue space that is at least two-dimensional. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the standard two-party game, whose players have complete preferences over a two… 

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