The Definition of Lying

@article{Carson2006TheDO,
  title={The Definition of Lying},
  author={Thomas L. Carson},
  journal={No{\^u}s},
  year={2006},
  volume={40},
  pages={284-306}
}
  • T. Carson
  • Published 1 June 2006
  • Philosophy
  • Noûs
Few moral questions have greater bearing on the conduct of our everyday lives than questions about the morality of lying. These questions are also important for ethical theory. An important test of any theory of right and wrong is whether it gives an adequate account of the morality of lying. Conceptual questions about the nature of lying are prior to questions about the moral status of lying. Any theory about the moral status of lying presupposes an account of what lying is. This paper… 

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References

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    Barnes gives numerous examples of this; see p. 114 and elsewhere in A Pack of Lies

      Nicolai Hartman also defends the view that lying violates an implicit promise to tell the truth

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        His definition implies that the intent to deceive others is a necessary condition of lying and is, therefore, open to the sort of objection presented above. 13 ''The Intent to Deceive

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        Also see Fried, Right and Wrong: ''A lie invites belief in an assertion which the speaker knows to be false

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