The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis

  title={The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis},
  author={Dustin Locke},
  pages={28 - 54}
  • D. Locke
  • Published 2 January 2014
  • Philosophy
  • Inquiry
Abstract Certain philosophers maintain that there is a ‘constitutive threshold for belief’: to believe that p just is to have a degree of confidence that p above a certain threshold. On the basis of this view, these philosophers defend what is known as ‘the Lockean Thesis’, according to which it is rational to believe that p just in case it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p above the constitutive threshold for belief. While not directly speaking to the controversy over the… 
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