The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound

  title={The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound},
  author={Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={437 - 456}
A large literature in political science takes for granted that democratic leaders would pay substantial domestic political costs for failing to carry out the public threats they make in international crises, and consequently that making threats substantially enhances their leverage in crisis bargaining. And yet proponents of this audience costs theory have presented very little evidence that this causal mechanism actually operates in real—as opposed to simulated—crises. We look for such… 
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Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach
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What makes international threats credible? Recent theories point to domestic audience costs—the domestic price a leader would pay for making foreign threats and then backing down. This article
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Domestic Audiences and Strategic Interests
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    The Journal of Politics
  • 2007
A number of recent studies assumes that international threats issued by democratic states are more credible because their leaders face domestic punishment for failing to carry them out. Yet this
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