The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession
@article{KurrildKlitgaard2000TheCE, title={The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession}, author={Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard}, journal={Public Choice}, year={2000}, volume={103}, pages={63-84} }
The paper extends and empirically tests GordonTullock's public choice theory of the nature of autocracy. A simple model of the relationship between constitutional rules governing succession in autocratic regimes and the occurrence of coups against autocrats is sketched. The model is applied to a case study of coups against monarchs in Denmark in the period ca. 935–1849. A clear connection is found between the specific constitutional rules governing succession and the frequency of coups… CONTINUE READING
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