The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts

  title={The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts},
  author={Rocco J. Gennaro},
Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views… 
Toward a standard model of consciousness: Reconciling the attention schema, global workspace, higher-order thought, and illusionist theories
How people’s understanding of consciousness may have been shaped by an implicit theory of mind is examined to help to make sense of an apparent divide between the physically incoherent consciousness the authors think they have and the complex, rich, but mechanistic consciousness they may actually have.
Conceptualizing consciousness
ABSTRACT One of the most promising theories of consciousness currently available is higher-order thought (“HOT”) theory, according to which consciousness consists in having suitable HOTs regarding
Qualitative Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought : Themes from the Philosophy of
David Rosenthal explains conscious mentality in terms of two independent, though complementary, theories—the higher-order thought (“HOT”) theory of consciousness and quality-space theory (“QST”)
Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?
Many philosophers and scientists have argued that the difference between phenomenally conscious states and other kind of states lies in the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have.
The Essential Tension in Phenomenal Consciousness
Abstract The contemporary standard view of phenomenal consciousness (PC)—shared by reductionists and non-reductionists alike—takes it to be a simple, ‘low-level’, ‘pre-reflective’ feature of mental
Challenges in Current Philosophy of Self-Consciousness – The Heidelberg School
Based on the 2 × 2 matrix of current theories of self-consciousness developed in chapter “ A Brief Overview of Philosophy of Self-Consciousness”, this chapter presents key challenges in the current,
A conceptual framework for consciousness
  • M. Graziano
  • Psychology, Biology
    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
  • 2022
It is argued that consciousness has a logically sound, explanatory framework, different from typical accounts that suffer from hidden mysticism, and a proposed account of how consciousness may have evolved over millions of years, from fish to humans.
A Brief Overview of Philosophy of Self-Consciousness
  • G. Kreuch
  • Psychology, Philosophy
  • 2019
The main goal of the first part of this book is to present some important challenges in contemporary philosophy of self-consciousness. These challenges will motivate a deeper look into philosophy of
Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg
According to Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT.
The HOROR theory of phenomenal consciousness
One popular approach to theorizing about phenomenal consciousness has been to connect it to representations of a certain kind. Representational theories of consciousness can be further sub-divided


Same old, same old: the same-order representation theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor
It is argued that despite appearances, the same-order representation theory of consciousness fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy.
Sortal concepts, object individuation, and language
  • Fei Xu
  • Psychology, Philosophy
    Trends in Cognitive Sciences
  • 2007
The plurality of concepts
It is argued that endorsing pluralism does not lead to eliminativism about concepts as an object of scientific interest, and outline a pluralist theory of concepts that rejects this assumption.
McDowell, demonstrative concepts, and nonconceptual representational content
In giving an account of the content of perceptual experience, several authors, including Fred Dretske, Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke, and Michael Tye, have employed the notion of nonconceptual
The origins of concepts
A conception of learning is presented that sidesteps the arguments against the possibility of concept learning, and several mechanisms that result in the generation of new primitive concepts are sketched that deserve to be called learning mechanisms.
Distracted Drivers and Unattended Experience
Since the driver is supposed to be completely distracted by other cognitive tasks, he cannot form higher-order representations of his visual states, with the result that those states are disqualified.