The Congressional Pork Barrel in a Republican Era

  title={The Congressional Pork Barrel in a Republican Era},
  author={Kenneth N. Bickers and Robert M. Stein},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  pages={1070 - 1086}
In this article, we ask what the pattern of distributive spending has been during the 104th. Congress, in which Republicans have been in the majority, compared to the preceding Congress when Democrats were the majority party. We seek to understand the patterns of change in light of four alternative explanations of distributive spending. The changes in the content and recipients of federal domestic outlays between the 103rd and 104th. Congresses are suggestive of a partisan influence. Republican… 

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    American Political Science Review
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    American Political Science Review
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