The Conflict Behavior of Authoritarian Regimes

@article{Peceny2004TheCB,
  title={The Conflict Behavior of Authoritarian Regimes},
  author={Mark Peceny and Christopher K. Butler},
  journal={International Politics},
  year={2004},
  volume={41},
  pages={565-581}
}
In order to understand what makes democracies unique, we need to develop a deeper understanding of the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes. If any of the competing explanations of the democratic peace can also account for similar behavior among specific types of authoritarian regimes, we can have more confidence in the power of that approach for understanding the relationship between political regimes and international peace. Previous work using a data set compiled by Barbara Geddes… 

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