The Complexity of Stable Matchings under Substitutable Preferences

@inproceedings{Deng2017TheCO,
  title={The Complexity of Stable Matchings under Substitutable Preferences},
  author={Yuan Deng and Debmalya Panigrahi and Bo Waggoner},
  booktitle={AAAI},
  year={2017}
}
In various matching market settings, such as hospital-doctor matching markets (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005), the existence of stable outcomes depends on substitutability of preferences. But can these stable matchings be computed efficiently, as in the one-to-one matching case? The algorithm of (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) requires efficient implementation of a choice function over substitutable preferences. We show that even given efficient access to a value oracle or preference relation… 

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