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@inproceedings{Daskalakis2014TheCO, title={The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design}, author={Constantinos Daskalakis and Alan Deckelbaum and Christos Tzamos}, booktitle={SODA}, year={2014} }

- Published 2014 in SODA
DOI:10.1137/1.9781611973402.96

Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic game theory, but its complexity has remained poorly understood. We answer this question by showing that a revenue-optimal auction in multi-item settings cannot be found and implemented computationally efficiently, unless ZPP = P. This is true even for aâ€¦Â CONTINUE READING

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