The Complexity of Online Manipulation of Sequential Elections

  title={The Complexity of Online Manipulation of Sequential Elections},
  author={E. Hemaspaandra and L. A. Hemaspaandra and J. Rothe},
  • E. Hemaspaandra, L. A. Hemaspaandra, J. Rothe
  • Published 2013
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • ArXiv
  • Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential. We introduce a framework, in which manipulators can see the past votes but not the future ones, to model online coalitional manipulation of sequential elections, and we show that here manipulation can be extremely complex even for election systems with simple winner problems. We also show that for some of the most important election systems such… CONTINUE READING

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