The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Limit-Average Games

@inproceedings{Ummels2011TheCO,
  title={The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Limit-Average Games},
  author={Michael Ummels and Dominik Wojtczak},
  booktitle={CONCUR},
  year={2011}
}
We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is decidable, even if we put a constraint on the payoff of the equilibrium. Our undecidability result holds even for a restricted class of concurrent games, where nonzero rewards occur only on terminal states. Moreover, we… CONTINUE READING
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The complexity of Nash equilibria in limit-average games

  • M. Ummels, D. Wojtczak
  • Tech. Rep. LSV-11-15, ENS Cachan,
  • 2011

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