The Complexity of Contracts

@article{Dtting2020TheCO,
  title={The Complexity of Contracts},
  author={Paul D{\"u}tting and T. Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2020},
  volume={abs/2002.12034}
}
We initiate the study of computing (near-)optimal contracts in succinctly representable principal-agent settings. Here optimality means maximizing the principal's expected payoff over all incentive-compatible contracts-known in economics as “second-best” solutions. We also study a natural relaxation to approximately incentive-compatible contracts. We focus on principal-agent settings with succinctly described (and exponentially large) outcome spaces. We show that the computational complexity of… Expand
1 Citations

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