The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions

  title={The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions},
  author={Özgür Gürerk and Bernd Irlenbusch and Bettina Rockenbach},
  pages={108 - 111}
Understanding the fundamental patterns and determinants of human cooperation and the maintenance of social order in human societies is a challenge across disciplines. The existing empirical evidence for the higher levels of cooperation when altruistic punishment is present versus when it is absent systematically ignores the institutional competition inherent in human societies. Whether punishment would be deliberately adopted and would similarly enhance cooperation when directly competing with… 

Endogenous emergence of institutions to sustain cooperation

Formal and informal institutions, such as laws and social norms, are pervasive in daily life. They help maintain cooperation by coordinating and constraining individuals’ behaviors. However, our

Social Norms, Endogenous Sorting and the Culture of Cooperation

Throughout human history, informal sanctions by peers were ubiquitous and played a key role in the enforcement of social norms and the provision of public goods. However, a considerable body of

Creating an Efficient Culture of Cooperation

Throughout human history, informal sanctions by peers were ubiquitous and played a key role in the enforcement of social norms and the provision of public goods. However, a considerable body of

Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons

Neither other-regarding tendencies or preferences for reciprocity and equity, nor group selection or prescriptions from higher authorities, are necessary for the emergence and stability of rudimentary forms of sanctioning institutions regulating common pool resources and enforcing collaborative efforts.

Social Control and the Social Contract: The Emergence of Sanctioning Systems for Collective Action

The role of voluntary participation in establishing and upholding cooperation with or without punishment is reviewed, and two distinct forms of punishment are dealt with, namely peer punishment and pool punishment, and their stability and their efficiency are compared.

The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract

A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat of punishment can curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enterprises. Since punishment is

On the emergence of a sanctioning institution

This paper theoretically studies the emergence of a sanctioning institution in a selfish and wealth-diverse group where the provision of a public good is realized only once. In particular, we present

Institutional Endogeneity and Third-Party Punishment in Social Dilemmas

This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in social dilemmas. We allow individuals to vote on the introduction of

Endogenous choice of institutional punishment mechanisms to promote social cooperation

Does the desirability of social institutions for public goods provision depend on the extent to which they include mechanisms for endogenous enforcement of cooperative behavior? We consider

Institutional Legitimacy and Public Goods Games: A Laboratory Experiment on the Distribution of Sanctioning Power

From the seminal work of Fehr and Gachter (2000), a consensus rises about sanctioning institutions and its effectiveness in promoting collective action and cooperation. Most observed institutional



Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism

This work shows experimentally that the prevailing self-interest approach has serious shortcomings because it overlooks negative effects of sanctions on human altruism, and challenges proximate and ultimate theories of human cooperation that neglect the distinction between fair and unfair sanctions.

Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms

Strong reciprocity cannot be rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of human cooperation (in other words, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signaling theory), however, multilevel selection theories of cultural evolution are consistent with strong reciprocity.

Why people punish defectors. Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas.

In this paper, we present a cultural evolutionary model in which norms for cooperation and punishment are acquired via two cognitive mechanisms: (1) payoff-biased transmission-a tendency to copy the

Norm enforcement among the Ju/’hoansi Bushmen

This paper will use data from 308 conversations among the Ju/’hoansi (!Kung) Bushmen to examine the dynamics of norm enforcement, to evaluate the costs of punishment in a forager society and understand how they are reduced, and to determine whether hypotheses that center on individual self-interest provide sufficient explanations for bearing the costs for norm enforcement.

The evolution of altruistic punishment

It is shown that an important asymmetry between altruistic cooperation and altruistic punishment allows altruistic punished to evolve in populations engaged in one-time, anonymous interactions, and this process allows both altruism punishment and altruism cooperation to be maintained even when groups are large.