The Combinatorial World (of Auctions) According to GARP

@inproceedings{Boodaghians2015TheCW,
  title={The Combinatorial World (of Auctions) According to GARP},
  author={Shant Boodaghians and Adrian Vetta},
  booktitle={Algorithmic Game Theory},
  year={2015}
}
Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as constraints in mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications such as combinatorial auctions. In the auction setting, we present an efficient combinatorial algorithm to find a virtual valuation function with the optimal (additive) rationality guarantee. Moreover, we show that there exists such a valuation function that both is individually… 

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