The Combinatorial Seller ’ s Bid Double Auction : An Asymptotically Efficient Market Mechanism *

@inproceedings{Jain2006TheCS,
  title={The Combinatorial Seller ’ s Bid Double Auction : An Asymptotically Efficient Market Mechanism *},
  author={Rahul Jain and Pravin Varaiya},
  year={2006}
}
We consider the problem of efficient mechanism design for multilateral trading of multiple goods with independent private types for players and incomplete information among them. The problem is partly motivated by an efficient resource allocation problem in communication networks where there are both buyers and sellers. In such a setting, ex post budget balance and individual rationality are key requirements, while efficiency and incentive compatibility are desirable goals. Such mechanisms are… CONTINUE READING
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