The Coevolution of Cultural Groups and Ingroup Favoritism

  title={The Coevolution of Cultural Groups and Ingroup Favoritism},
  author={Charles Efferson and Rafael Lalive and Ernst Fehr},
  pages={1844 - 1849}
Cultural boundaries have often been the basis for discrimination, nationalism, religious wars, and genocide. Little is known, however, about how cultural groups form or the evolutionary forces behind group affiliation and ingroup favoritism. Hence, we examine these forces experimentally and show that arbitrary symbolic markers, though initially meaningless, evolve to play a key role in cultural group formation and ingroup favoritism because they enable a population of heterogeneous individuals… Expand

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