The Classical Model of Science: a millennia-old model of scientific rationality

@article{Jong2008TheCM,
  title={The Classical Model of Science: a millennia-old model of scientific rationality},
  author={Willem R. de Jong and Arianna Betti},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2008},
  volume={174},
  pages={185-203}
}
Throughout more than two millennia philosophers adhered massively to ideal standards of scientific rationality going back ultimately to Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora. These standards got progressively shaped by and adapted to new scientific needs and tendencies. Nevertheless, a core of conditions capturing the fundamentals of what a proper science should look like remained remarkably constant all along. Call this cluster of conditions the Classical Model of Science. In this paper we will do… 
Frege and the Aristotelian Model of Science
Although profoundly influential for essentially the whole of philosophy’s twenty-five hundred year history, the model of a science that is outlined in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics has recently
Proclus on the order of philosophy of nature
  • M. Martijn
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
    Synthese
  • 2008
TLDR
It is shown that Proclus is an adherent of the Classical Model of Science as set out elsewhere in this issue, and that he adjusts certain conditions of the Model to his Neoplatonic epistemology and metaphysics.
Axiomatic Natural Philosophy and the Emergence of Biology as a Science
TLDR
It is shown that at least two major contributors to the emergence of biology in Germany—Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus—sought to provide a conception of the new science of life that satisfies the criteria of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science.
On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science: A Defense of the Received View
  • Sebastian Lutz
  • Philosophy
    HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science
  • 2012
The Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl is now generally considered to have failed for a variety of reasons, bringing down a number of dependent
Kant’s Ideal of Systematicity in Historical Context
Abstract This article explains Kant’s claim that sciences must take, at least as their ideal, the form of a ‘system’. I argue that Kant’s notion of systematicity can be understood against the
Reflections on the revolution at Stanford
  • F. Muller
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
    Synthese
  • 2009
TLDR
It is expound some critical reflections on the Model Revolution and the conclusions will be that the philosophical problem of what a scientific theory is has not been solved yet—pace Suppes.
Frege, the Normativity of Logic, and the Kantian Tradition
This paper considers the role of constitutivity and normativity in Frege’s conception of logic. It outlines an historical interpretation with two goals. First, it traces these concepts back to their
Kant’s conception of proper science
  • H. Berg
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
    Synthese
  • 2009
TLDR
It is shown that only in this way it can be explained why Kant thought (1) that mathematics has a particular foundational function with respect to the natural sciences and (2) as such secures their scientific status.
The mother of chaos and night: Kant's metaphilosophical attack on indifferentism
ion, this is a basically analytical task, in which we examine our concepts in order to make ourselves explicitly aware of their possible uses. It is not entirely unlike like the process of defining a
The analytic-synthetic distinction and the classical model of science: Kant, Bolzano and Frege
TLDR
It will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio ex principiis.
...
1
2
3
4
5
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 80 REFERENCES
CRITICAL EPOCHS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF SCIENCE
  • E. Beth
  • Mathematics
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1950
THB present paper is bom from the conviction that recent discussions on die foundations of mathematics and physical science cannot be fully understood without reference to their historical and
The analytic-synthetic distinction and the classical model of science: Kant, Bolzano and Frege
TLDR
It will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio ex principiis.
How is Metaphysics as a Science Possible? Kant on the Distinction between Philosophical and Mathematical Method
I METAPHYSICS AS A SCIENCE AND THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION. In his important study on Kant and the exact sciences, Michael Friedman argues rather convincingly that "much of Kant's
Aristotle’s prohibition rule on kind-crossing and the definition of mathematics as a science of quantities
The article evaluates the Domain Postulate of the Classical Model of Science and the related Aristotelian prohibition rule on kind-crossing as interpretative tools in the history of the development
On the status of proofs by contradiction in the seventeenth century
In this paper I show that proofs by contradiction were a serious problem in seventeenth century mathematics and philosophy. Their status was put into question and positive mathematical developments
Bernard Bolzano, Analyticity and the Aristotelian Model of Science
Quine's well-known 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1951) plays a key role in the debate about the analytic-synthetic distinction. Taking to task the ideas of Carnap in particular, Quine shows that
Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth Century
TLDR
Mancosu provides the first comprehensive account of the relationship between mathematical advances of the seventeenth century and the philosophy of mathematics of the period with a sophisticated picture of the subtle dependencies between technical development and philosophical reflection.
Bolzano a priori knowledge, and the Classical Model of Science
TLDR
It is argued that, for Bolzano, a priori knowledge is knowledge by virtue of meaning and that Bolziano has substantial views about meaning and what it is to know the latter.
The Dynamics of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century
Preface The Tradition of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy. Two These and Seventeen Answers, Chritoph Luthy, Cees Leijenhorst and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen Modifications of the Method of Inquiry in
Frege’s Begriffsschrift as a lingua characteristica
TLDR
It is argued that the Begriffsschrift is a language since, unlike calculi, its sentential expressions express truths, and it is a characteristic language, since the meaning of its complex expressions depend only on the meanings of their constituents and on the way they are put together.
...
1
2
3
4
5
...