The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology


The goal of this chapter is to mount a critique of the claim that cognitive content (that is, the kind of content possessed by our concepts and thoughts) makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenal properties of our mental lives. We therefore defend the view that phenomenal consciousness is exclusively experiential (or nonconceptual) in character. The main focus of the chapter is on the alleged contribution that concepts make to the phenomenology of visual experience. For we take it that if cognitive phenomenology is to be found anywhere, it should be found here. However, we begin with a discussion of the question of cognitive phenomenology more generally, and we close by sketching how our argument might be extended into the domain of non-perceptual thought.

Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Carruthers2010TheCA, title={The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology}, author={Peter Carruthers and B{\'e}n{\'e}dicte Veillet}, year={2010} }