The Burr Dilemma in Approval Voting

  title={The Burr Dilemma in Approval Voting},
  author={Jack H. Nagel},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  pages={43 - 58}
  • J. Nagel
  • Published 1 February 2007
  • Economics
  • The Journal of Politics
Problems of multicandidate races in U.S. presidential elections motivated the modern invention and advocacy of approval voting; but it has not previously been recognized that the first four presidential elections (1788–1800) were conducted using a variant of approval voting. That experiment ended disastrously in 1800 with the infamous Electoral College tie between Jefferson and Burr. The tie, this paper shows, resulted less from miscalculation than from a strategic tension built into approval… 
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