The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

@article{Alexandrova1964TheBJ,
  title={The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science},
  author={Anna Alexandrova},
  journal={Nature},
  year={1964},
  volume={201},
  pages={1171-1171}
}
Well-being, health and freedom are some of the many phenomena of interest to science whose definition relies on a normative standard. Empirical generalizations about them thus present a special case of value-ladenness. I propose the notion of a ‘mixed claim’ to denote such generalizations. Against the prevailing wisdom, I argue that we should not seek to eliminate them from science. Rather, we need to develop principles for their legitimate use. Philosophers of science have already reconciled… Expand
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  • Synthese
  • 2011
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It is concluded that scientists, philosophers, and ethicists should discard the project of defining life, because empirical evidence shows that life cannot be defined. Expand
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