The Bearable Lightness of Being

  title={The Bearable Lightness of Being},
  author={B. Hale},
  • B. Hale
  • Published 2010
  • Mathematics
  • Axiomathes
How are philosophical questions about what kinds of things there are to be understood and how are they to be answered? This paper defends broadly Fregean answers to these questions. Ontological categories—such as object, property, and relation—are explained in terms of a prior logical categorization of expressions, as singular terms, predicates of varying degree and level, etc. Questions about what kinds of object, property, etc., there are are, on this approach, reduce to questions about truth… Expand
Possible predicates and actual properties
  • R. Cook
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Synthese
  • 2014
An enriched deflationist account of properties—the Infinitary Deflationary Conception of Existence—supports the standard semantics for models with countable first-order domains, and allows one to prove the categoricity of the second-order Peano axioms. Expand
From the unity of the proposition to linguistic idealism
  • R. Gaskin
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • Synthese
  • 2016
The paper argues that the general structure of the world is asymmetrically dependent on a metaphysically (though not historically) prior fact about language, namely that it exhibits subject–predicate (in general: function–argument) structure. Expand
Bolzano’s Definition of Analytic Propositions
We begin by drawing attention to some drawbacks of what we shall call the Frege-Quine definition of analytic truth. With this we contrast the definition of analytic propositions given by Bolzano inExpand
Naming the concept horse
Frege’s rejection of singular reference to concepts is centrally implicated in his notorious paradox of the concept horse. I distinguish a number of claims in which that rejection might consist andExpand
  • A. Klev
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • The Review of Symbolic Logic
  • 2017
It will be argued that the grammatical subject of this sentence, ‘the concept horse’, indeed refers to a concept, and not to an object, as Frege once held. Expand
Hume’s principle: a plea for austerity
This work will provide an argument in favour of a nominalist construal of numerical equations and the implications for the use of numerals and for the understanding of ontological questions for the existence of numbers are spelled out. Expand
A Guide to the Concept Horse
A first-order variable (‘x’, ‘y’, . . . ) is a variable that takes the position of singular terms. Accordingly, in a first-order language one can replace the singular term ‘Bucephalus’ inExpand
The concept horse with no name
In this paper I argue that Frege’s concept horse paradox is not easily avoided. I do so without appealing to Wright’s Reference Principle. I then use this result to show that Hale and Wright’s recentExpand
Deflationism in Semantics and Metaphysics


The metaontology of abstraction
ion as a legitimate form of implicit definition has been authenticated. And it is this, so it may be suggested, that requires the development of satisfactory answers to (M) and (E) and relatedExpand
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The problem of abstract entities Empiricists are in general rather suspicious with respect to any kind of abstract entities like properties, classes, relations, numbers, propositions, etc. TheyExpand
On What There Is
In this paper I begin by considering some remarks of Professor W. V. Quine’s on what he calls ‘the ontological problem’.1 Professor Quine holds that from the fact that a sign has meaning it does not,Expand
On What There is Not
entities, were they thinking only that it would be more convenient . . . was there not a suggestion that their reason for renouncing them was that they did not believe in their existence?' ([I7], p.Expand
The Problem of Mathematical Objects
In seeking a foundation for mathematics, one may be looking for what may be called a foundation in the logical sense: a single, unified set of principles—perhaps unified by their jointly constitutingExpand
Focus restored: Comments on John MacFarlane
This paper argues that the crucial issue concerns the capacity of either stipulation—of Hume’s Principle, or of the Dedekind-Peano axioms—to found knowledge of the principles involved, and that in this regard there are crucial differences which explain why the former can be explained, but the latter cannot. Expand
The 'inflationary' argument of chapter 1 of Truth and Objectivity-the argument that the classical deflationary conception of truth must, on its own assumptions, inflate into something moreExpand
Word and Object
This edition offers a new preface by Quine's student and colleague Dagfinn Follesdal that describes the never-realized plans for a second edition of Word and Object, in which Quine would offer a more unified treatment of the public nature of meaning, modalities, and propositional attitudes. Expand
Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond
There is an important, but largely underground, philosophical current running at least from the Epicureans to modern times, with major outflowings in Reid and in Meinong, according to which many of aExpand
On some arguments for the necessity of necessity
Must we believe in logical necessity? I examine an argument for an affirmative answer given by Ian McFetridge in his posthumously published paper "Logical Necessity: Some Issues", and explain why itExpand